

The First Cracks in the Imperial Base of the Post-War USSR *Georgia and the South Caucasus, 1946-1956*

Georges MAMOULIA

Dr., FRANCE

If we look through the history of Georgia, as a part of the Soviet Union during the 1940ies and 50ies, we will be very surprised to find many contradictions in the domestic life of Georgian society.

Life was a mixture of suffocating Bolshevik totalitarianism and provincial nationalism, which was only superficially colored with Official Ideology.

We will try to find answers to the most urgent questions in the recent history of Soviet Georgia, with reference to archived data which had been sealed up for many years. How important was nationalism and how did it influence life within the republic? Which methods did the local government use to maintain internal political stability in the country? What influence did politics in Moscow, with its ongoing fight for ultimate power in the Kremlin, have on Georgian society?

In the previous article we dealt with the foreign and internal issues of the so-called Turkish and Iranian crisis of 1945-47.

Should the territorial claims of the South Caucasian republics be satisfied at the expense of Turkey and Iran the Kremlin, as noted above, was contemplating changes in the borders of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan: in the case of Iran's Azerbaijan unification with Soviet Azerbaijan, Saingilo province (Kakhi, Zakatala and Belakani) would be returned to Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. These decisions seem to be have been approved by Stalin, as a compensation for an extension of the territory held by the Turkic-speaking populations of the SSR of Azerbaijan. Subsequently, if the above-mentioned territories were also returned to Georgia and Armenia, that would lead to establishment of ethnically homogenous republics in the South Caucasus.¹

For the same reason, the Kremlin was eager for reconciliation with the anticommunist political émigrés from the Caucasus. The South Caucasian communist governments deemed that the realization of these projects, closely linked with the recovery of Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani historical territories, would portray them as the defenders of their respective peoples' national interests.

Thus, the Georgian Soviet government, led by K. Charkviani, tried to persuade Stalin to give a “positive solution” to the territorial issues, as it would lead to the stabilization of the republic.

Yet, the Kremlin's eventual failure to return the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani territories revived discontent not only among the public, but also in the local communist hierarchies of higher echelons. That was the time when, as researchers say, Russian nationalism, propped up by Stalin under the disguise of “Soviet patriotism” during the Second World War, was turning into contempt and arrogance towards the smaller nations. The Russians' role as the saviors of the Soviet Union had been hyped to an unbelievable level and chauvinism emerged all over the territory, including the military corps of the district officers. Thus, with Russian



chauvinism colliding with Caucasian nationalism a conflict between the ruling center of the Red empire and the South Caucasian republics was becoming ever more likely.

The confrontation came to a head in the spring of 1947 as a result of power changes in Kremlin, resulting in a weakening of L. Beria's position.

In 1938, after leaving Tbilisi for Moscow, Beria had managed to maintain his personal control over Georgia. Like Stalin he was a member of the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party and could personally determine key issues in matters of recruitment.²

In his memoirs N. Khrushchev noted that:

“The affairs of Georgia were run by Beria, who had previously held the position of Secretary of Georgia's Communist Party's Central Committee. He supported it and allowed no one to interfere in Georgian affairs. Moreover, Beria was the only person to inform Stalin about Georgia”.³

A. Mgeladze, the former First Secretary of Georgian Communist Party, who was later to become an active opponent of Beria, noted that until 1951 the Georgian government had referred to Beria for all the important issues and only after that went to Stalin.⁴

In 1946 V. Merkulov, a protégé of Beria, was replaced as Minister of State Security of the USSR by V. Abakumov, the former head of “SmerSh” – the Main Department of military counter-intelligence. At the same time Beria had been stripped of his power to control recruitment in the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. From 1947 on, that power would be entrusted to A. Kuznetsov⁵, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the leader of the so-called “Leningrad team” and an enthusiastic Great-Russian chauvinist.

Soon, on Stalin's instructions, Beria's men in Georgia would experience further impact. In January 1948 Abakumov replaced A. Rapava, one of Beria's closest associates, by N. Rukhadze as Georgian Minister of State Security; the new Minister's first steps were to purge the ministry of personnel loyal to Rapava.

In May of the same year, another of Beria's associates, P. Sharia, was dismissed from his position as Propaganda Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. Sharia had been sent to France in 1945, to establish contacts with the Georgian émigrés there.⁶

Not surprisingly, as the Georgian communist's influence was fading in the Kremlin, the supporters of Great-Russian chauvinism in Caucasia – namely the high command of the Transcaucasia military district, tried to take advantage of the situation.

In 1942 Stalin had ordered 10 national divisions to be recruited from the populations of the South Caucasian republics. Parts of those divisions had taken part in the hostilities and by the end of the war three divisions only had been left in the Transcaucasia military district, namely the 414th Georgian, the 86th Armenian and the 216th Azerbaijan divisions.

Effective command of the troops in the South Caucasia had since 1947 been in the hands of two deputy commanders of the Transcaucasia military district: Colonel-general M. Kazakov, as Chief of Staff of the district, and major-general D. Kolesnikov as deputy commander of the district for political matters.

Marshal F. Tolbukhin, the commander of the Transcaucasia district, who had good relations not only with Beria but also with the Georgian communist leaders, had left his post due to health reasons and, unlike him, his successor general Antonov did not have enough power or simply did not want to oppose the increasing tendency towards Russian chauvinism.

On November 10 1947, lieutenant-general N. Rukhadze, head of the department of counter intelligence at the Ministry of the State Security of the Transcaucasia military District, informed the commander of the armies of the district, as well as the communist leaders of the region, that

“incidents of Great Russian chauvinism in the military units of the district have been on the rise”.⁷

Rukhadze stressed that, in all the units of the district, counter intelligence had observed many instances of Great Russian bigotry.

“Meanwhile the commanders of the units, high-ranking officers and generals did not wish to curb chauvinistic behavior in the military forces, moreover they have themselves encouraged soldiers towards it”.⁸

In his letter, Rukhadze gave several sample quotations from the heads of regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies, all of them hateful towards the Caucasian peoples.

The growth of such ideas had some basis in the existing social conditions. Compared with the other Soviet republics, collectivization in Georgia at the beginning of 1930s had been relatively more liberal, which had left more economic freedom to the peasants. As a consequence, they made noticeable income from private properties like gardens and farms and their living conditions were better than in Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. That is why Slavic military officers in district accused the Georgian population of being “speculators”.

The Russian soldiers in Armenia were similarly discontented with their poor living conditions. In 1946, with the hope of getting back the Armenian territories from Turkey, thousands of repatriates had returned to Armenia, and that drew a lot on resources, as the whole housing stock of Armenia was devoted to meeting the needs of the newcomers.

Generals Kozakov and Kolesnikov took advantage of the situation and embarked on a policy of complete Russification of the military forces under their command.

First they decided to abolish the Caucasian divisions by recruiting all the units in the district from outside bases, with the final aim of having them manned with mainly Russian soldiers. Their plan was to facilitate the process of assimilation and Russification of the younger generation of Caucasians. Deprived of the possibility to serve in their own national divisions in Transcaucasia, the local recruits would be sent to other regions of the Soviet Union. If they married Russian women, most of them would stay there, and not return to their home countries.

From a legal point of view, Kozakov and Kolesnikov had not even received official approval for their plan from the general staff and army headquarters.

“Send us as many Petrovs and Ivanovs as possible, appoint as few local officers as possible” – told his colleagues general Kozakov.⁹

It is obvious that Kazakov's and Kolesnikov's initiatives and pronouncements were not only spontaneous expressions of ingrained Great Russian chauvinism, but in fact a deliberate policy of the Soviet military leadership in Transcaucasia.

The best example of it was Azerbaijan, which underwent the same policy.

In 1948, after being appointed to the position of commander in chief of the 4th Army located in Azerbaijan, colonel-general Kolpakchi grossly interfered in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan demanding that First Secretary Bagirov unquestioningly execute all his orders.¹⁰

Even more aggressive was the behavior of the officers of the military units based in Abkhazia. On 30 September 1948, colonel Porshakov started spreading the rumors that soon city Sokhumi would be taken away from Georgia and annexed to the Krasnodar region of Russia. Said colonel, responsible for the ideological education of officers, “justified” this alleged move with the following “arguments”:

“After these measures Sokhumi, like Sochi, will become one of the most beautiful of resort cities. It is clear that the Krasnodar region will be a better guarantee for this than Georgia. In this way life will become much better, it will be fantastic for our children, since they won't have to study Georgian at school and will no longer waste their time learning such a useless language as Georgian”.¹¹

In such conditions, if they wanted to maintain stability, public order, and their own prestige and power, the leadership of the Georgian republic under Charkviani had more or less to use personal ties in order to defend Georgian national interests.

Possibly on Beria's advice, the Georgian government took its case to Stalin at the very moment when, after the North Atlantic alliance had been established in April 1949, it was essential for the Kremlin to maintain stability in the national republics in the border regions.

The Georgian government's main argument was that the activity of the above-mentioned generals was undermining inter-ethnic harmony in the republic, as well as unity at the rear of the Transcaucasia military district.¹²

On August 30 of the same year, the Ministry of Defense of Soviet Union ordered the dismissal of both generals from their positions and the Caucasian military divisions continued existing until 1956.¹³

Nevertheless, from May 1949 until Stalin's death, a tendency to destabilization in the social and political life of Georgia could be noticed. In that period Georgia, like the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Moldova suffered massive deportations as well as the purges which had begun in 1951 with the so called “Mingrelian Affair”.

After the formation of the North Atlantic alliance, in order to reinforce its control over the border republics, the Stalin regime took to ethnically cleansing the South Caucasus, even of people who never had any connections with the countries that had become enemies in the context of the “Cold War”.

All the foreigners who lived in Georgia while being citizens of other countries, or had no citizenship, as well as those foreigners who had Soviet citizenship, were exiled.

In 1949, a special order was issued by Georgian security minister Rukhadze, according to which heaps of compromising materials in the archives of the Georgian MGB had been seized and pored over. On the basis of those documents, which hardly contained any evidence, but only denunciations, approximately 25,000 case files were created. Those 25,000 innocent people were subjected to monitoring by informants, whose reports led to the deportation of the majority of this group.¹⁴

In the meantime the Kremlin was trying to purge the border republics of any people they thought could bring even the slightest damage to the Red empire. On May 7 1949, the minister of Security of Georgia asked the Kremlin to deport from the coast of the republic 180 Russian “Starovyery” (“Old Believers”), former residents of Turkey who had immigrated to Georgia in 1925-26 and had become citizens of the Soviet Union.¹⁵

That, however, was only a prelude. On May 29 1949, two month after the formation of North Atlantic alliance, a decision was made by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to deport from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, as well as from the Krasnodar region of Russia and Black Sea coast as a whole, Greeks, Turks and “Dashnaks”. By the latter, the Soviet authorities meant the repatriated Armenians who had returned to the South Caucasus in 1945-48.

On 14-18th June 1949, the Soviet authorities deported 31,274 Greeks, 2,500 Turks and 2,677 “Dashnaks”. Altogether 36,451 people were exiled.¹⁶

If the deportation of Greeks from the Black Sea coast of Georgia was a typical Stalinist reaction to the defeat of the communists in the civil war in Greece, the reason for the deportation of the Armenians was

obvious from the report by Rukhadze to Charkviani.

Armenian repatriates had come to USSR with the aim to return in the Armenian lands that the Kremlin was supposedly going to take back from Turkey. After the project had failed, this repatriates, once eager followers of Kremlin, had increasingly become its opponents.

Rukhadze stressed that Armenian nationalism in Georgia would cause a negative reaction from the local population, which would later result in public and political destabilization and tense inter-ethnic relations in the republic.¹⁷

Some researchers claim, that the Georgian Soviet government tried to take advantage of the expulsion of the Greeks from the Black Sea coastline of Abkhazia, by resettling there collective farm workers from Western Georgia, who suffered from a lack of tillable land. Some of them even spoke of a “great Georgian colonization”¹⁸. Yet, no document has been found in the archives to confirm such assertions.

A letter of 7 June 1949, written by Charkviani to Stalin makes it clear that the Georgian government had only moved western Georgian farmers to Abkhazia in order to preserve the subtropical crops and the tobacco harvest. For the USSR, as it lived in conditions of economic autarky, it was extremely important to take these measures, and move to Abkhazia workers from collective farms in western Georgia with the necessary skills, as they dealt with the same subtropical agriculture there as in Abkhazia.¹⁹

A campaign of ideological control was launched in an effort to subdue the social dissatisfaction that was becoming more and more evident.

According to a resolution passed on 19th April of 1949 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, urgent measures were taken to defend the territory of the Red Empire “against anti-Soviet broadcasting”. From July of that year the leadership of Soviet Georgia implemented technical measures to jam the “Voice of America”, the “BBC” and other western broadcasting programs.²⁰ Extreme anti-Western propaganda was unleashed on the populations of the border regions. A resolution passed by the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party stressed the particular importance of propaganda in the areas neighboring Turkey. The population was to understand that the Turkish rulers were betraying their country at the behest of the American imperialists, who wanted to use it as a military bridgehead against Soviet Union. The population was called upon “to provide active assistance to the border troops in engineering and the technical outfitting of the state border”.²¹

As it carried out those measures, the Soviet government considered it essential to strangle any emerging dissent in the crib, an extremely rigid attitude which was typical of the last years of the Stalin regime. The reaction of ordinary Georgian populations towards this policy was noticed even by the few foreign observers who were staying in Georgia at the time. For example rear admiral R. Peltier, the French naval attaché in the USSR, visited the republic in 1949 and noted that

“in this republic national feelings express themselves in two basic ways: through Georgian pride, and latent hostility towards the Russians”.²²

In November 1951 Georgia was hit again by a new wave of repression and destabilization. In an effort to obtain compromising material against L. Beria and achieve total control over Georgia, Stalin had launched the so called “Mingrelian Affair”. Its real purpose was to rid the republic of all of Beria's protégés, by gathering incriminating evidence on Beria himself, with the intent of “proving” that the former NKVD boss had been engaged in a double game with the Western secret services.²³

With that aim the Second Secretary of the Communist party of Georgia M. Baramia, Minister of Justice A. Rapava, prosecutor of the republic V. Shonia, and nearly all the party regional secretaries of the Mingrelian districts were imprisoned.

On 16 November 1951, several days after the “Mingrelian Affair” had started, on Stalin's direct order



the Central Committee of the Communist party of the USSR passed an unprecedentedly severe resolution on “deporting hostile elements from the territory of the Georgian SSR”.

On 29 November a similar directive was issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The text of the directive read as follows:

“To deport for eternity from the boundaries of the Georgian SSR to Southern Kazakhstan and the Jambul district of the Kazakh SSR the close relatives (parents and wives, sons with their families, and daughters, brothers and sisters living separately but on whom compromising material has been obtained) of émigrés, traitors to the Fatherland and non-returnees living abroad and conducting hostile work against the Soviet Union; of émigrés and traitors to the Fatherland from among Ajarian Georgians living in Turkey; of émigrés and traitors to the Fatherland from among residents of regions of Georgia with Muslim populations who live in Turkey, and also returned émigrés who came to Georgia in 1946-49 from France, Iran and China, former prisoners of war, those who have served in the national minority units of the former Fascist German army, former travelers abroad who have suspicious ties with Turkish intelligence, with their families – a general total of 6,300 persons”.²⁴

The fact that, among all the South Caucasian republics, such a draconian directive had only been imposed with regard to the Georgian SSR, illustrates the force and bitterness of the Stalin-Beria conflict.

Intimidated by Stalin's apparent wrath, the Georgian Soviet government was forced into a large sacrifice. The number of people to be sent to an exile eventually doubled. Instead of 6,300, the overall number of people to be exiled reached 11,200.²⁵

First Secretary of the Communist party of Georgia Charkviani, who had been governing the republic from 1938, was dismissed and replaced by a new favorite of Stalin, A. Mgeladze. In October of 1952, by Stalin's direct order A. Mgeladze had been elected as a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Union.²⁶

Mgeladze kept the prosecutions going in the “Mingrelian Affair”, as well as the deportations. The purges were carried out not only in the party, but also in the Komsomol.

At the same time, curious things happened. The Georgian Minister of State Security N. Rukhadze, who in 1952 had himself been dismissed and arrested for alleged dereliction of duty while running the “Mingrelian Affair”, totally annihilated the network of NKVD agents on the Soviet-Turkish border on strict instructions from the Kremlin. On his orders, almost all those secret agents were accused of playing a double game and deported from Georgia.²⁷

The first aim of the new Minister of State Security, A. Kotchlavashvili was to reestablish the secret network of agents on the Soviet-Turkish border.²⁸ In his report from July 25 1952, Mgeladze informed Stalin about having built a 95 km-long signal system to protect the Georgian-Turkish border. A control line had been restored on 283 km of borders, and a signals system built on 100 km. To protect the Sea borders, radio observation posts had been created in Gonio and Bichvinta.²⁹

Summarizing all the facts mentioned above, one can say that in 1949-53 the destabilization in Georgia was caused by:

- 1) the peripheral position of the republic;
- 2) National minorities, whom Stalin considered untrustworthy after the beginning of the Cold war;
- 3) A covert struggle for power in the Kremlin and Stalin's desire to rid the Politburo of undesirable colleagues, which turned Georgia into a test case. In Georgia this translated into a purge of Beria's people. Stalin sought to achieve full control over Georgia, with the same power there as Beria had had from 1931 to 1951;
- 4) A general absurdity in politics typical of the last years of Stalin's rule.

Tension in Georgia continued even after the death of Stalin. Paradoxically, Georgian loyalty towards the Kremlin was finally destroyed by Khrushchev's policy of destalinization.

The aim of the well-known demonstrations which took place in Georgia on March 4-9 1956 was not at all to preserve Stalin's image. The demonstrators, who looked like provincial ones, were actually protesting against the rise of Great Russian chauvinism and the anti-Georgian mood prompted by the famous Khrushchev speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist party of the USSR.

Along with all the factors mentioned above, public discontent in Georgia also hailed from social motives. The Kremlin wanted to take away from the Georgian peasants the incomes they were getting from their farmlands, as he wanted to make them totally dependent on collective farms, like they were in Russia and the other republics of the Soviet Union.³⁰

During 4-9 March 1956, anti-governmental demonstrations covered the whole of Georgia. Moscow blamed V. Mjavanadze, the newly appointed First Secretary of the Georgian Communist party, for everything that was happening in the republic. Afraid of losing his position, Mjavanadze asked the Kremlin to use the army against the demonstrators. “ – Mjavanadze has asked for the tanks”, – said M. Suslov as the Central Committee met in Moscow on 8 March.³¹

According to the archive sources, the main bulk of the demonstrations were students and other representatives of the younger generation. On 9 March, Soviet soldiers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators at the Telegraph house, killing dozens of protesters. The massacre revived anger and protest in the Georgian public. The myth of the Soviet Union as a multinational society had evaporated. Latent disagreements emerged in the inter-ethnic relations of the republic.

On 23 May 1956, summoned to a Central Committee meeting in Moscow, Mjavanadze, eager to keep his position, claimed that there had been no instance of inter-ethnic hostility during the demonstrations in Georgia.³² Documents from the archives, however, prove the opposite.

The links between the Georgians and the Kremlin had been cut and the archives fully confirm this. Here are examples of statements from the Russian officers of the first Armoured division engaged in shooting down the demonstrators:

“The Georgians' demonstration in the square and near the statue [of Stalin] is no ordinary thing. This is a counterrevolutionary demonstration planned in advance. Washington is involved in this incident and has spent a lot of money for that”.

“These people should be shot on the spot”.

“I am personally pleased that soldiers intervened in this incident. Georgians should understand that we have only one government of the Soviet Union”.³³

At the same time discontent and agitation increased in the 74th Georgian Soviet infantry division, located near Kutaisi, who on 4-13th March together with the Kutaisi garrison was kept mobilized in case of an emergency. According to documents from the counter-intelligence of the Transcaucasia military district, most of the Georgian officers received information about the events in Tbilisi from the “Voice of America”. Some of officers even said that in the case of a war, they would eagerly take the West's side.

“In France the government does not shoot demonstrators”.

“The 'Voice of America' broadcasts everything as it really happens”.

“If the people desire something no government can stop them, they will achieve everything”.

“If the war starts we all will throw away our shoulder-straps”.

One of the officers even insisted on sending special group to Moscow for a terrorist attack.³⁴

It was no accident that the 74th Georgian Soviet division was disbanded shortly after that.

Panic-ridden reports by counter-intelligence clearly show that the bloodshed in Tbilisi had sparked protests in nearly all of Georgia's Universities and Institutes, turning into a national movement against the Red empire.

After a couple of weeks following the 9th March massacre, few people cared about Stalin. Most Georgian students expressed solidarity towards the peoples of Poland and Hungary, who were also rising against the Kremlin's tyranny.³⁵

At that time Moscow distrusted the Georgians so much that it did not even trust agents of the Georgian KGB, relying instead on secret information from the counter-intelligence department of the Transcaucasia military district.

On June 5 1956, the chief of Georgian KGB general A. Inauri informed Mjavanadze, that according to his intelligence:

“anti-Russian and nationalistic feelings now involve people who had not taken part in the March demonstrations and did not have any kind of connection with suspicious activities before”.

“Foreign countries intelligence services are trying to get information about the ongoing events in Georgia from foreign visitors (tourists, different delegations, and diplomats) of the capital and regions”.³⁶

After Inauri's report, Mjavanadze turned to the Central Committee in Moscow with a request to reopen the KGB departments in the different regions of Georgia where they had been abolished after the death of Stalin.³⁷

On September 19th of the same year, the chief of the counter-intelligence of the Transcaucasia military district, lieutenant-general Zhelezniakov, sent a report to the Second Secretary of the Georgian Communist party, P. Kovanov. The document, covering mainly military issues, stressed that one of the aims of the Western agents in Georgia and Azerbaijan was to probe “public opinion on fighting against the Stalin cult and the Bagirov trial”.³⁸

It is important to indicate that this report had not been sent to Mjavanadze, a Georgian, but to the Russian Kovanov, who was but the Second Secretary of the Georgian Communist party. It is clear that, in this case, Khrushchev had used traditional imperial methods to control the ruling class in Georgia by appointing a Russian official to the position of Second Secretary and making him responsible for security issues.

It is no accident either that, several months after the massacre in Tbilisi, on July 10 1956, while meeting with an Italian communist delegation, Khrushchev justified his policy with the following “explanations”:

“The situation had soured in Georgia because most of the employees in the mines and factories are Russian. The Georgians compose only 60% of the population, the other 40% being Russians, Armenians, Ukrainians, etc. There is not a single Russian in the government there. In the Stalin era you might not even mention this fact”.³⁹

In conclusion, one can say that the events of March 1956 played a decisive role in the revival and growth of the Georgian national liberation movement after the Second World War. The ideological ties between Kremlin and Georgia were severed. The shooting of peaceful protesters demonstrating under slogans to defend Stalin's image (who, due to the poor political culture in Georgia, had played the same role for Georgia's integration in the Soviet Union, as Orthodox Christianity in the Russian Empire of the 19th century) shattered their naive and provincial illusions. From then on, most Georgians would understand that the national independence of Georgia was predicated on the destruction of the Kremlin Empire, whatever its political

system was.

Notes

1. Mamoulia G. Gruzija v pervye gody holodnoj vojny (Neizvestnye stranici iranskogo i tureckogo krizisa 1945-47gg.) [Georgia in the first years of the Cold War – unknown pages of the Turkish and Iranian crisis 1945-47], Vertikaly istorii, Tbilisi, 2003, n°5, pp. 55-73.
2. Suny R. G. The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2nd Ed., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 287.
3. Hruščev N. S. Vremja, ljudi, vlast' [Time, People and Power], Moscow, “Moskovskie novosti”, 1999, Vol. II, pp. 58-59.
4. Mgeladze A. Stalin: kakim ja ego znal. Stranici nedavnego prošlogo [Stalin as I knew him. Pages from a recent past], Tbilisi, 2001, p. 248.
5. Petrov N. Represii v apparate MGB v poslednie godi žizni Stalina [Purges in the ranks of the MGB in the last years of Stalin's life 1951-1953], Cahiers du Monde russe, Paris, 2003, n° 44/2-3, p. 405.
6. Knight A. Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 149.
7. Ismailov E. Vlast' i narod. Poslevoennyj stalinizm v Azerbaidžane 1945-1953 [People and Power. Stalinism in Azerbaijan after the Second World War], Baku, “Adilogli”, 2003, p. 260.
8. State Archive of the Political Parties and Social Organizations of the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku). F. 1, O. 168, D. 6, Ll. 40-41.
9. III Section of the Archive Administration of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Georgia (MoIA), F. 14, O. 23, D. 561, Ll. 15-16.
10. Ismailov E. Vlast' i narod. Poslevoennyj stalinizm v Azerbaidžane 1945-1953, p. 261.
11. III Section of the Archive Administration of the MoIA. F. 14, O. 22, D. 427, Ll. 66-67, 73.
12. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 23, D. 561, Ll. 8-9.
13. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 23, D. 561, L. 2.
14. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 26, D. 32, L. 168.
15. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 23, D. 557, L. 131.
16. Afanasiev I. N., Gregori P., Danielson E. (Ed). Istorija Stalinskogo Gulaga [History of Stalin's Gulag], Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2004, Vol. I, pp. 537-538.
17. III Section of the Archive Administration of MoIA, F. 14, O. 27, D. 252, Ll. 83-87.
18. Jidkov S. Brosok maloj imperii [The thrust of small Empire], Maikop, 1996, pp. 35-41.
19. III Section of the Archive Administration of MoIA, F. 14, O. 27, D. 252, L. 68.
20. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 23, D. 557, Ll. 7-16.
21. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 21, D. 520, L. 60.
22. Peltier R. Attaché naval à Moscou, Paris, France-Empire, 1954, p. 136.
23. Knight A. Beria, Stalin's first lieutenant, pp. 159-164; Sudoplatov. P. Specoperacii. Lubjanka i krem' 1930-1950 godi [Special Operations. The Lubianka and the Kremlin 1930-1950], Moscow, “Olma-press”, 1997, pp. 509-514; Stoljarov K. Igrы v pravosudie [Games in justice], Moscow, “Olma-press”, 2000, pp. 141-210. Hlevnjuk O., Gorlickij I., Košeleva L. P. (Ed). CK VKP(b) i Sovet Ministrov SSSR 1945-1953 [The Central Committee of the Communist party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1945-1953], Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2002, pp. 349-354; Denisov V. V., Kvašonkin A. V., Malašenko L.N. (Ed). CK VKP(b) I regionalnie partijnie komiteti 1945-1953 [The Central Committee of the Communist party and the regional party Committees], Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2004, pp. 252-259.
- Hlevnjuk O. Stalin i organy gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti v poslevoennyj period [Stalin and organs of the State Security after the Second World War], Cahiers du Monde russe, Paris, 2001, n° 42/2-3-4, pp. 542-543; Petrov N. Represii v apparate MGB v poslednie godi žizni Stalina 1951-1953 [Purges in the ranks of the MGB in the last years of Stalin's life 1951-1953], pp. 414-417.
24. Istorija stalinskogo Gulaga, Vol. I, p. 544.
25. Naumov V., Sigačev I. M. (Ed). Lavrentij Berija.1953. Stenogramma jul'skogo plenuma CK KPSS I drugye dokumenty [Lavrenti Beria. 1953 Stenogram of July Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the USSR and other documents], Moscow, meždunarodnyj fond “demokratija”, 1999, pp. 34-35.
26. Mgeladze A. Stalin kakim ja ego znal. Stranici nedavnego prošlogo, p. 241.
27. III Section of the Archive Administration of MoIA, F. 14, O. 26, D. 380, L. 87.
28. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 26, D. 32, L. 163.
29. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 26, D. 380, Ll. 86-93.
30. Hruščev N. U Stalina byli momenty prosvetlenija. Zapis besedy s delegaciej italjanskoj kompartii [Stalin had moments of lucidity. Record of the talk with the delegation of the Italian Communist party], Istočnik, Moscow, 1994, n°2, p. 87.



Chapter 2: Security and Stability Policies, Anti-Terrorism Policy, Conflict Resolution Policy

31. Fursenko A. A. (Ed). Prezidium CK KPSS 1954-1964. Černovie protokolnye zapisi zasedanij. Stenogrammy [Presidium of the Central Committee of Communist party of the USSR 1954-1964. Cessions protocols drafts. Stenogramms], Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2004, Vol. I, p. 112.
32. Ibidem, p. 133.
33. III Section of the Archive Administration of MoIA, F. 14, O. 31, D. 297, Ll. 27-37.
34. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 31, D. 297, Ll. 1-19.
35. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 31, D. 297, Ll. 48-55.
36. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 31, D. 201, Ll. 92-93.
37. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 31, D. 201, L. 91.
38. Ibidem, F. 14, O. 31, D. 297, L. 44.
39. Khrushchev N. U stalina byli momenty prosvetlenia, p. 87.

